Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization Among Asthmatics: Do Patient Copayments Matter? by William H. Crown et al.
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
BENEFIT PLAN DESIGN AND PRESCRIPTION
DRUG UTILIZATION AMONG ASTHMATICS:














Research support from the Ad Hoc Committee on the Economics of the Pharmaceutical Industry to Medstat
and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Program on the Pharmaceutical Industry is gratefully
acknowledged.  The opinions and views expressed in this paper are those only of the authors, and do not
necessarily reflect those of the research sponsors or of the institutions with whom the authors are affiliated.
The authors would like to thank Mark Pauly for his thoughtful comments.  The views expressed herein are
those of the authors and not necessarily those of the National Bureau of Economic Research.
©2003 by William H. Crown, Ernst R. Berndt, Onur Baser, Stan N. Finkelstein, Whitney P. Witt, 
Jonathan Maguire, and Kenan E. Haver.  All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed two
paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice, is given
to the source. Benefit Plan Design and Prescription Drug Utilization Among Asthmatics:
Do Patient Copyaments Matter?
William H. Crown, Ernst R. Berndt, Onur Baser, Stan N. Finkelstein, Whitney P. Witt, 
Jonathan Maguire, and Kenan E. Haver
NBER Working Paper No. 10062
October 2003
JEL No. D12, I11, G22
ABSTRACT
Objective: The ratio of controller to reliever medication use has been proposed as a measure of
treatment quality for asthma patients. In this study we examine the effects of plan level mean out-of-
pocket asthma medication patient copayments and other features of benefit plan design on the use
of controller medications alone, controller and reliever medications (combination therapy), and
reliever medications alone.
Methods: 1995-2000 MarketScan™ claims data were used to construct plan-level out-of-pocket
copayment and physician/practice prescriber preference variables for asthma medications. Separate
multinomial logit models were estimated for patients in fee-for-service (FFS) and non-FFS plans
relating benefit plan design features, physician/practice prescribing preferences, patient
demographics, patient comorbidities and county-level income variables to patient-level asthma
treatment patterns.
Results: We find that the controller reliever ratio rose steadily over 1995-2000, along with out-of-
pocket payments for asthma medications, which rose more for controllers than for relievers.
However, after controlling for other variables, plan level mean out-of-pocket copayments were not
found to have a statistically significant influence upon patient-level asthma treatment patterns. On
the other hand, physician practice prescribing patterns strongly influenced patient level treatment
patterns.
Conclusions: There is no strong statistical evidence that higher levels of out-of-pocket copayments
for prescription drugs influence asthma treatment patterns. However, physician/practice prescribing
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I. INTRODUCTION 
  It has long been known that tradeoffs exist between the gains from pooling across 
individuals to insure against catastrophic medical expenditures, and the efficiency losses from 
the moral hazard effects that arise due to the implicit marginal subsidies to health services 
utilization that occur under conventional medical insurance plans.
1  The existence of this tradeoff 
suggests that, given preferences and costs, there may be an optimal amount of coinsurance.  
Using data from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment in the 1980s, Manning and Marquis 
[1996] have estimated that with an $8000 cap on total expenditures, the optimal coinsurance rate 
would have been about 50%.
2   
  Although coinsurance rates for office visits, emergency room, inpatient hospitalization 
and prescription drug services were set to be equal in the design of the RAND Health Insurance 
Experiment, in practice currently in the U.S. coinsurance and, more commonly, patient 
copayment amounts differ considerably among the different categories of health care services.
3 
  Within the last decade considerable controversy has arisen involving the design of 
prescription drug benefits in health insurance plans.  This controversy reflects in part the fact that 
prescription drugs have become an increasingly important component of health care costs, rising 
sharply from 5.6% in 1980 to 9.7% in 2000.
4  Continuing a recent pattern, in 2001 total 
prescription drug expenditures in the U.S. increased by about 17%.
5  In levels, the $172.8 billion 
implied an average of about $600 per capita, although the underlying distribution is highly 
skewed. 
  Managed care organizations, and the employers with whom they contract, have attempted 
to control rising prescription drug costs by changing cost sharing provisions, seeking to steer use HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   2 - 
to preferred drugs on the insurer's list of approved medications ("formularies").
6  Already in the 
early and mid-1990s, plans began experimenting with two-tier copayment schemes, in which a 
low patient copay (say, $5) was assessed for a generic (first tier) drug, and a somewhat higher 
but still modest copay (say, $10) was assessed for (second tier) branded drugs; in some rare 
cases, physicians needed prior authorization from the payer before being granted permission to 
prescribe particularly costly medications.   
  After seeing continued increases in their prescription drug costs, in the mid and late 
1990s some plans began implementing less generous three-tier copay schemes.  A typical three-
tier plan design of several years ago consisted of a $5 copay for a first tier generic drug, a $10 
copay for a "preferred" branded drug within a given therapeutic class (the second tier); and a 
heftier $25 copay for the "non-preferred" branded third tier drugs within the therapeutic class.  
Many plans also had a second, more generous three-tier system for mail order pharmacy 
prescriptions.  
  Use of the three-tier copayment designs created incentives not only for insurees to shift 
toward increased use of the less costly medications, but it also gave insurance plans and payers 
increased bargaining power with pharmaceutical companies by allowing them to threaten to 
banish their branded products to the third tier, unless drug manufacturers offered the payer 
substantial discounts or rebates.
7   
  Frustrated again by continued increases in prescription drug spending, more recently 
many plans have increased the levels of prescription drug copayments at all three tiers, with the 
third tier copayment as high as $40 or $50 per prescription, while other plans have turned to 
coinsurance rather than copayment designs.  According to one source, in 2000 the average 
patient retail copayment for a generic first tier drug was $7.17, that for preferred brands in the 
second tier was $14.14, while that for all other nonpreferred brands on the third tier was $27.35.
8 
  The increased use of multi-tier copayment design mechanisms for prescription drugs 
raises at least two sets of important issues:  (i) do variations in copay structures alter the level 
and composition of prescription drug utilization?  Are they effective instruments in controlling HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   3 - 
prescription drug costs?
9  Or instead do persistent physician prescribing patterns dominate, with 
copayment variations having only a negligible impact?  And (ii),  to the extent three-tier copays 
affect the level and composition of drug utilization, what are the associated health outcomes?  
Can copayment design mechanisms be used not only to control costs, but also to steer utilization 
to more medically appropriate uses of prescription drugs?
10  In this paper, we examine the first 
question in detail, and although we discuss possibilities concerning the second, we leave it 
largely for future research.  We also examine variation over time and among plans involving 
copayments for other medical services, such as physician office visits, emergency room 
treatments, and inpatient hospitalizations. 
  We address these issues using the therapeutic class of asthma medications as a case 
study.  As described in further detail below, asthma drugs can be envisaged as being primarily 
"reliever" medications (used to relieve symptoms in an acute asthmatic exacerbation -- an asthma 
"attack"), or as being primarily "controller" medications (used to control pulmonary 
inflammation and prevent an "attack").  For some time now, health care officials have argued 
that the appropriate use of controller medications can result in reduced outpatient office visits, 
emergency room treatments and inpatient hospitalizations.
11  While the optimal ratio of asthma 
controller to reliever drug utilization is difficult to quantify precisely (and likely is patient 
idiosyncratic), it is widely believed that in most cases increases in the controller/reliever ratio are 
beneficial, both in terms of economic and medical considerations.
12  Interestingly, a recent 
historical overview of trends in asthma pharmacotherapy between 1978 and 2002 by Stafford et 
al. [2002] suggests that particularly in the last decade, the controller/reliever ratio has increased 
while the number of asthma-related office visits has stabilized or declined.   
  Before proceeding with a discussion of hypotheses to be tested, underlying data and 
econometric methods, we first digress and provide some medical background on asthma and its 
treatment. 
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II.         BACKGROUND ON ASTHMA AND ITS TREATMENT 
 
Asthma is a chronic disease characterized by inflammation of the airways and constricted 
bronchial tubes.  Asthma affects about six percent of the population and is the third most 
common chronic condition among children.  Although death from asthma is fairly unusual, 
morbidity from the condition is common.  Since 1991, when consensus guidelines on the 
treatment of asthma were first released by the National Asthma Education Program [1991], 
clinicians have encouraged the use of maintenance therapy, typically using inhaled 
corticosteriods to “control” inflammation and to reverse chronic airway obstruction and hyper-
reactivity.  Other medications, particularly the short-acting beta-two agonist class of 
bronchodilators, are recommended to be reserved for “relief” of acute episodes of 
bronchospasm.
13 
  A number of published articles have examined the benefits that have accrued as the 
preference of “controller” to “reliever” medications as maintenance therapy for asthma has 
gained acceptance.
14  Some of these articles have attempted to correlate a particular metric, 
commonly called the “C/B ratio” (ratio of inhaled corticosteroids to bronchodilators) with 
population-wide changes in survival and medical services utilization.
15  Greater use of inhaled 
corticosteriods relative to bronchodilators has been reported to be associated with lower 
mortality rates and less frequent use of emergency room, inpatient and outpatient services in the 
care of patients with asthma.
16  
III.  HYPOTHESIS TO BE TESTED/ASSESSED EMPIRICALLY 
We empirically assess the effects of several benefit plan design features on asthma 
treatment patterns.  In particular, we test the hypothesis that higher controller/reliever copay 
ratios will be associated with reduced use of controller medications, other things being equal, and HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   5 - 
whether any effects differ by plan type: fee-for-service (“FFS”) versus non-FFS plans.  Finally, 
we examine whether physician practice prescribing patterns influence patient-level asthma 
treatment patterns and, if so, whether these effects differ between FFS and non-FFS plans.  
 
IV.  DATA SOURCES AND CONSTRUCTION OF VARIABLES 
 
The MarketScan™ private insurance database for 1995–2000 was used in this study.  
MarketScan™ is the largest database of its kind, containing detailed descriptions of inpatient,  
outpatient medical, and outpatient prescription drug services for approximately three million 
persons in 2000 who were covered by corporate-sponsored healthcare plans.  These individuals’ 
healthcare was provided under a variety of fee-for-service (FFS), fully capitated, and partially 
capitated health plans, including exclusive provider organizations, preferred provider 
organizations, point of service plans, indemnity plans, and health maintenance organizations. 
Race, ethnicity, and income information were extracted from a different data set, the 
Bureau of Health Professions Area Resource File (ARF), a compendium of county-level 
information produced annually.  The ARF data were then merged with the MEDSTAT analytic 
file by county.    
Identification of asthma patients 
Patients with evidence of asthma were selected from the intersection of the claims, 
encounter, enrollment, and pharmaceutical data files.  Evidence of asthma was provided by 
searching the claims data during 1995–2000 for individuals meeting any of the following 
criteria:   
•  At least two outpatient claims with primary or secondary diagnoses of asthma; or 
•  At least one emergency room claim with primary diagnosis of asthma, and a drug  HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   6 - 
transaction for an asthma drug 90 days prior or 7 days following emergency room claim;  or  
at least one inpatient claim with a primary diagnosis of asthma; or  
•  A secondary diagnosis of asthma and a primary diagnosis of respiratory infection in an  
 
 outpatient or inpatient claim; or at least one drug transaction for a(n): anti-inflammatory   
 




Patients with a diagnosis of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD), who had one or 
more diagnosis or procedure codes indicating pregnancy or delivery, or who were not 
continuously enrolled for 24 months, were excluded from our study group. 
Measures 
 
Socio-demographic characteristics.  The sociodemographic characteristics included the: 
age of the head of the household; percent female; geographic region (Northeast, North Central, 
South, West, and unknown); member type, and year of entry into the study.  In addition, several 
socio-demographic variables defined at the county level were merged with the patient-level data.  
These variables included racial composition (%white, %black, %other), and income strata. 
Plan Type.  Fee-for service plans were defined as plans that did not have an incentive for 
patients to use a particular list of providers, including basic, major medical, and comprehensive 
health insurance coverage.  The remaining plans, called non-FFS, were defined as plans that 
either required patients to choose from a list of providers or provided financial incentives to use a 
specific list of providers.  Non-FFS plans included:  exclusive provider organizations, health 
maintenance organizations, non-capitated point-of-service plans, preferred provider 
organizations, or capitated or partially-capitated point-of-service plans. HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   7 - 
Copayments.  Copayments for outpatient pharmaceuticals were calculated by first 
stratifying all prescription drug claims by year, then by plan within year.  Next, we calculated the 
average out-of-pocket patient copayments for asthma drugs by therapeutic class for each plan, as 
well as the ratio of mean controller copayments to mean reliever copayments.  These plan level 
ratios were then attached to each patient’s record within a given plan.   
We also constructed variables for the average out of pocket copayments paid for 
outpatient physician visits, emergency room visits, and hospital stays. The average copayment 
captured the actual dollar amount that the patients paid out of pocket.  Note that we use the term 
“copayment” to refer to any out-of-pocket payment by individuals for health care.  This includes 
both traditional copayments (e.g., $5 per office visit) as well as coinsurance (e.g., patient pays 
20% of the bill). 
Comorbidities.  A number of asthma-related comorbidities were examined.  These 
included allergic rhinitis, anxiety, depression, gastroesophageal reflux disease (GERD), and 
migraine.  The number of unique three-digit ICD-9 codes (International Classification of 
Diseases, Ninth Revision) was used as a proxy for extent of overall medical and mental health 
comorbidities.     
Charlson Index scores were generated to capture the level and burden of comorbidity.  
This index draws upon diagnostic information from ICD-9 codes and procedure codes, resulting 
in nineteen conditions that are weighted based on the adjusted risk of one-year mortality.  The 
index score is the sum of the weights for all of a patient’s conditions and ranges from one to six, 
with higher numbers indicating increased levels of comorbidity.
17  The Charlson Index has been 
highly effective in predicting clinical outcomes and costs.
18  Of particular importance for our 
research, a recent study by Sin and Tu [2001] found that high levels of co-morbidity, as HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   8 - 
measured by the Charlson Index, were strongly associated with the underuse of inhaled steroid 
therapy in elderly patients with asthma.  
Utilization.  Utilization of healthcare services or prescription drugs was captured through 
claims and encounters over the study period.  For individuals, we examined the mean annualized 
number of emergency room visits, hospitalizations, hospital days, outpatient visits, and 
allergy/asthma specialist visits.  Prescription drugs for treatment of persons with asthma were 
categorized as either “controller” or “reliever” medications.  Controllers included: inhaled anti-
inflammatory agents, oral corticosteroids, oral anti-leukotrienes, and long-acting 
bronchodilators; relievers were defined as drugs categorized as anticholinergics or inhaled short-
acting beta-agonists.   Based on this dichotomy, a ratio of controller to relievers was constructed 
and interpreted as a measure of adequate management of asthma. 
Costs.  The analytic file contains patients with fee-for-service health plans and those with 
partially- or fully-capitated plans.  However data on costs were not available for the capitated 
plans.  Therefore the value of patients’ service utilization under the capitated plan was priced and 
imputed using average payments from the MarketScan™ FFS inpatient and outpatient services 
by region, year, and procedure. 
V. ECONOMETRIC  METHODS 
Our econometric analysis proceeds in two steps, using a variant of the Lee [1983] 
multinomial logit selection model, as proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand [2001]: 
(i) we first model choice among three alternative drug treatments – only controller, only reliever, 
and combination controller-reliever, all on an annual basis.   We employ as identifying 
instruments (variables affecting choice of drug treatment, but not total expenditures) plan 
copayment variables, and physician/provider prescribing composition.  Then in (ii) we employ in HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   9 - 
least squares regressions of log total expenditures for each treatment arm, in addition to a usual 
set of covariates, the three “lambda selection terms” (conditional expectations of residuals from 
the three arms of the treatment selection model).  
More specifically, to reduce the potential for endogeneity between plan level copayment 
variables and plan level controller/reliever ratios in the multivariate analyses, we utilize a 
discrete counterpart to the plan-level controller/reliever ratio examined in the descriptive 
analyses.  In particular, we construct an annual patient-level dependent variable with three 
mutually exclusive categories:  controller drug alone (n=3903), a combination of a controller 
drug and a reliever drug (n=11,427), and a reliever drug alone (n=11,049).  A likelihood ratio 
test was carried out to examine whether separate models were required for the FFS and non-FFS 
samples.  Based upon the results of this test, we estimated separate multinomial logit models for 
the FFS and non-FFS subsamples.  County-level income variables were appended to patient 
records to augment the medical claims.  Robust standard errors were used to adjust for potential 
intra-county covariance among patients living in the same counties that may have been 
introduced by these variables.  Hausman tests were then conducted to compare selectivity-
corrected models with standard OLS models. 
In terms of instruments, we construct two sets of identifying variables.   Our first set is 
plan copayments.   For each year and plan, we calculate mean copayment values for each class of 
drug, and then take the ratio of controller mean to reliever mean copayment.   This plan-specific 
variable is utilized as a regressor in the multinomial drug treatment choice equations for each 
person year.   A second set involves calculating, for each physician/provider tax identification 
number in the claims data, the proportion of patients obtaining controller only, reliever only, and 
combination treatment.   In many cases this taxation ID covers a multi-physician medical HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   10 - 
practice, but in some cases it is unique to a single physician.   Since the sum of these three 
percentages is 100% for each physician/provider practice, we delete one of the three percentages, 
but include two of them as regressors in the multinomial drug treatment model.  We recognize 
that this still leaves room for some selectivity in the form of patients’ choice of physician and 
choice of plan, but nonetheless believe that this method provides a reasonable first step in 
mitigating the effects of such selectivity.   We also note that, in this paper we do not examine the 
implications of treatment patterns on components of subsequent health care utilization, although 
we do model total healthcare expenditures.   
VI. DESCRIPTIVE  RESULTS 
 
   Based on the definitions of asthma episodes discussed above, we obtained a sample that 
included 44,926 patients in FFS plans and 18, 305 in non-FFS plans (63,231 patients in total). 
Controller/Reliever Ratio.  As shown in Figure 1, the controller/reliever ratio has been 
rising over time.  Between 1995 and 1999, it increased by approximately 40%, with more rapid 
increases in the two most recent years. The ratio is consistently higher for patients in FFS plans 
than for those in non-FFS plans and, since 1997, the rate of increase appears to be higher for the 
FFS plan beneficiaries than for those in non-FFS plans.  However, irrespective of plan type, 
almost all plans had average controller/reliever ratios greater than one (plan-specific data not 
shown). 
Patient Demographics. Table 1 reports the demographic characteristics of the sample, 
stratified by FFS and non-FFS plans.  Patients in FFS plans had a mean age of 34 years 
compared to 27 years for non-FFS plans (p<.001) and were more likely to be female (57% versus 
52%, p<.001).  Patients in FFS plans were also more likely than patients in non-FFS plans to be HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   11 - 
located in the North Central region (67% versus 9%, p<.001), as well as more likely to receive 
their health care coverage as the employee rather than as the spouse or dependent (41% versus   
37%, p<.001). 
County Race and Income.  Substantial differences in racial distribution and mean income 
between FFS and non-FFS plans were evident from county-level U.S. Census data linked to the 
claims data.  The mean household county income of patients covered by FFS plans ($27,001) 
was significantly lower than that for patients covered by non-FFS plans ($31,223) (p<.001).  
Interestingly, the racial distribution of counties for patients covered by FFS plans was less likely 
to be white than that of non-FFS plans.  
Health Status.  As expected given possibilities for adverse selection, patients in FFS 
plans appear to be sicker than those in non-FFS plans.  Table 2 documents that patients in FFS 
plans have higher numbers of major diagnostic categories, higher Charlson comorbidity scores 
and higher rates of comorbidities of allergic rhinitis, depression, gastrointestinal disorders, and 
migraine (p<.001 for all comparisons).  The rate of comorbid anxiety was not statistically 
different between FFS and non-FFS plans (p=0.78).  Qualitatively similar patterns were evident 
both for patients ages 4-11 and those ages 12-64, although differences were typically larger for 
adults than for children. 
Copayments.  Table 3 indicates that prescription drug copayments are significantly higher 
in non-FFS plans than in FFS plans, for both asthma medications and nonasthma medications.  
Across all drugs and all years (1995-2000) the average out of pocket copayment made by 
patients in non-FFS plans was  $8.64 compared to $5.20 in FFS plans (p<.001).  However, as 
shown in Figure 2, average controller/reliever copayment ratios were higher in FFS plans than in 
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utilization ratios (see Figure 1).  In both types of plans the controller/reliever copayment ratio has 
been rising over time along with the increased use of controller medications. 
The mean copayments reported in Table 3 mask considerable variation in copayments 
over time and across plans.  Figure 3 illustrates that out-of-pocket copayments for asthma 
medications have been consistently higher for patients in non-FFS plans compared to patients in 
FFS plans.  Although both patients in both types of plans experienced significant jumps in out-
of-pocket copayments beginning in 1998, the gap between FFS and non-FFS plans appears to 
have narrowed.  In addition to these time trends, there is high variation in copayment levels for 
specific drugs within year.  For example, in 1999 copayments for fluticasone, an inhaled 
corticosteroid (a controller medication), varied from $2 in one plan to $28 in another plan.  
Similarly, 1999 copayments for albuterol, a short-acting beta agonist (a reliever medication, 
typically sold as a generic), ranged from $2 to $12 across plans.   
Figure 4 reports the trend in the ratio of total payments (third party payor plus patient 
copayment) for controller versus reliever prescription drug claims, alongside the trend in the 
ratio of patient out-of-pocket copayments for controller vs. reliever medications.  Both ratios 
show an upward trend, largely reflecting the increased use of controller medications.  However, 
Figure 4 clearly indicates that between 1995 and 1999 the total payment ratio rose at a steeper 
rate than the copayment ratio.  This suggests that, although large employers and health plans 
were using copayments to help manage rising prescription drug costs, at least between 1995 and 
1999 they appeared to be absorbing proportionately more of the cost increase than they passed 
on to beneficiaries in the form of higher copayments.   Put another way, the practice of medicine 
improved in the sense of both FFS and non-FFS beneficiaries increasing the controller/reliever HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   13 - 
utilization ratio, and while beneficiaries experienced increases in controller/reliever copayment 
ratios, third party payors bore an even larger increase in controller/reliever payments. 
Average copayments for outpatient visits, emergency room visits, and inpatient visits also 
differed between non-FFS and FFS plans (Table 3).  Although statistically significant, 
copayments for outpatient visits and emergency room visits were fairly similar across non-FFS 
and FFS plans.  By contrast, copayments for inpatient stays were significantly and materially 
higher among patients covered by FFS plans than those covered by non-FFS plans ($16.12 
versus $2.78, respectively, p<.001).  Hence, while non-FFS plans had significantly higher 
copayment rates for prescription drugs relative to FFS plans, the opposite took place in terms of 
inpatient copayments. 
Medication Use.  Table 4 summarizes the medication use of asthma patients covered by 
non-FFS and FFS health plans.  Patients covered by FFS plans have a higher ratio of controller to 
reliever medications than patients in non-FFS plans (1.49 versus 1.17, p<.001), as well as a 
higher number of annualized asthma prescriptions (4.89 versus 4.17, p<.001).  With the 
exception of leukotriene modifiers (the most recent new therapeutic agents), patients in FFS 
plans have more days of therapy and higher units dispensed for each therapeutic class of asthma 
medication than patients in non-FFS plans (p<.001 for all comparisons).  For leukotriene 
modifiers, days of therapy and units dispensed were higher for asthma patients covered by non-
FFS plans (p<.001). 
The most commonly prescribed asthma medications were the short acting beta agonists 
(SABAs).  Patients in non-FFS plans were somewhat more likely than patients in FFS plans to be 
prescribed SABAs, oral steroids, and leukotriene modifiers; they were less likely to be 
prescribed bronchodilators, inhaled steroids, and anticholinergics (p<.001 for all comparisons). HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   14 - 
Health Care Utilization.  Table 5 reports the non-prescription drug health care utilization 
of patients in non-FFS and FFS plans.  For each measure—emergency room visits, 
hospitalizations, hospital days, and outpatient visits—annualized utilization was higher in FFS 
plans than in non-FFS plans (p=0.09 for all comparisons).  Thus, despite higher 
controller/reliever medication ratios, health care utilization was higher in FFS plans than in non-
FFS plans.  However, this association is likely confounded by the greater average age and level 
of disease severity of patients covered by FFS plans (Table 2). 
VII. ECONOMETRIC  FINDINGS 
 
FFS Model.  Table 6 reports the results of a multinomial logit model of the log odds of a 
patient receiving controller medication alone, or a controller and a reliever (combination 
therapy), relative to a reliever alone.  Residents of the North Central region are significantly less 
likely to be treated with controllers alone or combination controllers-relievers than with relievers 
alone (p-values <0.01).  Females were significantly less likely to receive a combination treatment 
rather than a solo reliever treatment.  Adults were more likely to receive a controller alone, or a 
combination treatment (with the former being particularly large) than a reliever only treatment.    
We also included county-level variables from the Census as proxies for the income of 
patients--variables not available directly from the claims. Being in the highest average income 
county (>$35K) significantly increased the odds of receiving a controller-only treatment, but had 
no significant effect on combination treatment, relative to reliever-only treatments.   None of the 
other county characteristic income variables was statistically significant. 
The presence of allergic rhinitis increased the odds of getting a controller alone or a 
combination therapy relative to reliever only therapy.  Comorbidities of migraine or sinusitis had HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   15 - 
no significant impact on choice of drug therapy.   Depression reduced the odds of getting 
controller alone therapy relative to reliever alone, but had no significant impact on combination 
therapy.   Interestingly, the presence of an anxiety disorder increased the odds of getting a 
combination therapy (p-value <0.02), but had no significant impact on the probability of 
receiving either of the solo treatments.  The number of unique 3-digit ICD-9 codes was 
positively associated with the log odds of getting a controller alone, or a controller plus reliever, 
and thereby was implicitly negatively associated with the log odds of getting a reliever only 
therapy.     
  The ratio of plan mean controller to mean reliever copay had no significant impact on 
drug treatment choice (p-values > 0.50).  In results not shown, this lack of significance persisted 
when mean copays were entered separately in levels, or in various other forms.  On the other 
hand, the medication ratios measuring provider prescribing preferences for controller alone (p-
value <0.01) or for combination treatment (p-value <0.01) were positive, large and highly 
significant determinants for the probability of the patient receiving that therapy, relative to 
reliever only therapy.   In terms of cross-effects, only provider prescribing preferences for 
combination therapy positively and significantly affected the probability of a patient receiving 
controller-only therapy;  provider preferences for controller only therapy had no significant 
impact on the patient’s probability of receiving combination treatment (p-value = 0.184).  The 
chi-square test statistic for the null hypothesis that coefficient estimates on the copay and 
provider prescriber preference variables are simultaneously equal to zero indicate decisive 
rejection in both equations (p-values <0.01).  
Non-FFS Model.  Table 7 reports the results of the corresponding multinomial logit 
model for patients in non-FFS plans.  Living in the West reduced the odds of receiving either HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   16 - 
controller alone or combination treatment relative to reliever alone therapy.  Residents of the 
North Central region were more likely to receive combination treatment, but not controller only 
therapy, relative to controller alone treatment.  As in the FFS case, females were significantly 
less likely to receive combination treatment, relative to reliever only, and adults were more likely 
to receive a controller alone or a combination therapy (with the former being particularly large), 
relative to reliever-only treatment.  None of the county-level income variables from the Census 
was statistically significant. 
The presence of allergic rhinitis significantly increased the odds of getting controller only 
or combination therapy relative to reliever only treatment; the impacts of other comorbidities 
were similar in this non-FFS regression to those in the FFS analysis.  Higher numbers of unique 
3-digit ICD-9 codes significantly increased the odds of getting a controller alone or combination 
therapy relative to reliever only treatment.     
  As with the FFS model, the ratio of plan mean controller to mean reliever copayment had 
no significant impact on the probability of receiving controller-only therapy, although it did have 
a positive and significant impact on the odds of receiving combination treatment.  On the other 
hand, both medication percentages measuring provider prescribing preferences were highly 
significant determinants of the probability of a patient receiving the corresponding therapy; while 
these own effects were positive and significant, both cross-effects were not statistically 
significant.  The chi-square test statistics for the null hypothesis that coefficients on the copay 
and provider prescriber preference variables simultaneously equal zero indicate decisive 
rejection in both equations (p-values <0.01). 
  Turning now to the log total expenditure regressions for FFS (Table 8) and non-FFS 
(Table 9) beneficiaries, we provide parameter estimates with and without the sample selectivity HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   17 - 
adjustments, for each of the three treatment arms.   In the FFS regressions of Table 8, we first 
note that parameter estimates on the lambdas (conditional expected values of the residuals 
derived from each of multinomial logistic equations) are negative and statistically significant (all 
p-values <0.001).   Not surprisingly, differences between the selectivity-adjusted and unadjusted 
parameter estimates are particularly large for those variables significantly affecting prescriber 
therapy in the first-state multinomial logit equations.   For example, coefficient estimates on the 
adult variable in all three equations are much smaller in the selectivity-adjusted than in the 
unadjusted regressions; this also holds for the allergic rhinitis variable, where sign changes 
occur.   
  However, when a Hausman test is conducted to test whether the coefficient estimates 
differ significantly in the selectivity-adjusted and unadjusted OLS regressions with the FFS 
sample, the null hypothesis of parameter equality is not rejected; indeed, the test statistic is 
negative, a reflection of the fact that the difference in diagonal elements of the variance-
covariance matrices can in given samples be negative, even though asymptotically they are 
positive in expectation. 
  In terms of the non-FFS sample (Table 9), results are qualitatively similar to those with 
the FFS population.  In particular, estimates of the three lambdas are negative and significant in 
all three treatment equations (p-values ,0.001), with the exception of the reliever only equation 
where the negative estimate is not statistically significant.  While two of the three Hausman test 
statistics on parameter equality in the selectivity-adjusted and unadjusted OLS regressions are 
positive, in all three cases the null hypothesis is not rejected. HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   18 - 
 
VIII.  DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
 
  This study describes the patterns of medication use among patients with asthma, factors 
affecting the type of  drug therapy prescribed these patients, and impacts on total healthcare 
expenditures, using a dataset encompassing more than 25,000 patient years of claims.  The 
average controller/reliever ratios were found to be greater than one, both for members of non-
FFS (1.17) and FFS (1.49) plans.  Moreover, the controller/reliever medication ratio has been 
consistently rising over time, suggesting that the clinical practices it embodies reflects a 
considerable degree of acceptance of the consensus guidelines, and the supporting research 
literature. 
Theoretically, holding other things equal, one would expect higher relative prices for 
controller to reliever medicines to be associated with a lower controller/reliever ratio.  However, 
teasing this out of the data statistically is complex.  Shifts in the composition of drugs in the 
controller and reliever classes over time, and changes in plan design, could cause the ratio of 
controller to reliever copays to either rise or fall over time.  As shown in Figure 1, the 
controller/reliever medication ratio has been trending upward over time.  However, after 
controlling for other variables we do not find a statistically significant relationship between out-
of-pocket copayments and asthma treatment patterns.  Moreover, Figure 4 indicates that total 
payments (third party payor plus patient copay) have been rising more rapidly than copayments 
only,  suggesting that health plans and large employers are reluctant to increase copayments for 
covered beneficiaries at the same rate that total payments have increased.   In this sense and over HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   19 - 
this 1995-1999 time period, health plans and payors have contributed to greater diffusion of 
guideline-compatible treatments that favor increases in the controller/reliever ratio. 
  The observation that the prescribing of all classes of asthma medications (except 
leukotriene modifiers) was greater among members of FFS plans is generally consistent with the 
findings that these patients are “sicker” than their counterparts in non-FFS plans, as measured by 
the number of comorbid conditions and higher levels of health care utilization.  Asthma patients 
covered by FFS health plans made more extensive use of all other types of health services we 
examined, including inpatient hospitalizations, use of emergency services and ambulatory visits. 
  The principal objective of this study has been to examine whether and how the 
characteristics of health plan coverage as part of the employee benefits affects the therapy 
selection decision among patients with asthma.  The preponderance of clinical literature now 
suggests that patients with asthma experience more favorable clinical courses when they make 
regular use, often several times daily, of inhaled corticosteriods, leukotriene modifiers, and other 
medications that “control” inflammation and reversible airway disease.  In the descriptive 
analysis, we found that the controller/reliever ratio continued to rise (and its increase even 
accelerated in recent years) despite rising medication copays.  However, this apparent association 
between mean copayments at the plan level and plan-level controller/reliever ratios is potentially 
endogenous.  For example, if mean copayments are higher for controller medications than 
reliever medications, growing use of controllers would result in a rising mean copayment ratio 
for controller-to-reliever medications.  That is, at the plan level, the direction of influence 
between the controller-to-reliever copayments and the controller/reliever ratio could go in either 
direction, or even both ways.   HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   20 - 
To reduce the endogeneity problem, we examined the effect of plan-level copayment 
variables on individual treatment choices.  When we did so, no statistically significant 
association was found.  It is possible that this lack of association resulted from an understatement 
of the size of out-of-pocket copayments.  This understatement is due to the averaging of patient 
copays across asthma drugs and years at the plan level, an effort we undertook in order to reduce 
the number of degrees of freedom consumed by plan-, drug-, and year-specific copayments.   
Most of the large copayment increases have occurred since 1999.  Plans that instituted very large 
copayment increases for certain asthma drugs may, indeed, have shifted asthma treatment 
patterns.  However, in our analysis these more recent changes were aggregated with earlier 
experience of patients where copayment changes were not as common, nor as large.  Thus, we 
expect that there is a downward bias in our estimate of the copayment effect that deserves further 
scrutiny.   We have re-estimated our models using only 1998-2000 data, and while we obtained 
results on the copay variables that trended more toward becoming statistically significant, they 
were not significant at usual p-values.   We suspect that these copay variables will become more 
significant as additional years of post-2000 data are added to the sample. 
  On the other hand, we found that provider prescribing patterns were strongly associated 
with patient treatment patterns, although the nature of this association differed somewhat for 
patients in FFS and non-FFS plans.   We leave it for future research to assess whether, 
controlling for physician practice prescribing preferences, differences in copayment benefit 
design across plans serviced by the same physician practice result in statistically different 
treatment patterns.  It is of course possible instead that physician practice effects are dominant 
regardless of the variation in the copayment benefit designs of the plans covering the patients HEALTHCARE UTILIZATION: DO PATIENT COPAYMENTS MATTER?          -  PAGE   21 - 
they treat.   Resolution of this issue will have very important implications for the effectiveness of 
plan design in controlling healthcare costs. 
  In addition to the specific statistical issues already discussed, the conclusions from our 
analysis should be viewed in light of the limitations common to most retrospective studies.  In 
particular, although we have attempted to correct for selection bias associated with patients 
having higher versus lower controller to reliever ratios, other sources of selection bias may 
remain.  For example, the MarketScan claims data used in the analysis lack clinical measures of 
symptom severity (e.g., FEV-1 values).  In addition, missing data on within region location (e.g., 
rural, urban, suburban) could have introduced bias due to geographical variations in asthma 
treatment practice patterns.  
  Although future work is unlikely to be able to control for all sources of selection bias in 
retrospective database studies of the type reported here, the provider prescribing pattern variables 
appear to offer promise as identifying variables.  For example, future work could use 
instrumental variables or parametric selection models to control for unobserved factors 
associated with both treatment selection and outcomes when examining the effects of asthma 
treatments on health care utilization.  This general approach is likely to have broad applicability  
to other medical conditions and treatments as well. 
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FOOTNOTES 
 
                                                 
1See Zeckhauser [1970] for a seminal discussion.  For more recent analyses, see the exchanges 
among Nyman [1999], Blomqvist [2001], and Manning and Marquis [1996,2001]. 
 
2For evidence from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, see Newhouse [1993], Manning et 
al. [1986], Leibowitz, Manning and Newhouse [1985], and Marquis [1985].  More recent 
evidence for a more aged population is given in Feenberg and Skinnner [1994]. 
 
3 The term copayment typically refers to fixed payments by the individual for service received 
(e.g., five dollars for each generic prescription); coinsurance typically refers to a fixed 
percentage payment by the individual (e.g., 20% of the retail price of the drug).  In this paper, we 
use the term copayment to refer to any out of pocket payments by consumers for drugs or other 
services. 
 
4Berndt [2002]; also see Berndt [2001]. 
 
5IMS Health [2002]. 
 
6For policies and impacts of changing prescription drug cost-sharing provisions in Canada, see 
Alan et al. [2002], Grootendorst [2002], Poirier et al. [1998] and Tamblyn et al. [2001]. 
 
7For further discussion, see Berndt [2002] and the references cited therein. 
 
8See Pharmacy Benefit Management Institute [2001]. 
 
9For related empirical evidence (much of it quite dated), see Harris et al. [1990], Johnson et al. 
[1997], Leibowitz, Manning and Newhouse [1985], Marquis [1985] and Smith [1993]. 
 
10For related empirical analyses, see Keeler et al. [1985], Leibowitz et al. [1985], and Newhouse 
[1993].  
 
11 See, for example, Levine, Campen, Millares and Barrueta [2000]. 
 
12Gottlieb, Belser, and O’Connor [1995]; Frischer, et al. [1999]; Shelley, et al. [2000]. 
 
13See Jain and Golish [1996]; Majeed, Ferguson, and Field [1999]; Nestor, et al. [1998]; and Suissa, et al. [1994]. 
 
14Majeed, Ferguson, and Field [1999]; Nestor, et al. [1998]; Suissa, et al. [1994]; Laumann and Bjornson [1998]; 
and Donahue et al. [1997]. 
 
15Frischer, et al. [1999]; Shelley, et al. [2000]. 
 
16See, for example, Gottlieb, Belser and O’Connor [1995]. 
 
17For further details, see D’Hoore, Bouckaert, and Tilquin. [1996]. 
 
18See, for example, D’Hoore, Bouckaert, and Tilquin. [1996], and Beddhu et al. [2000]. FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 n/a
Trigger Type
(1) 2 OP Asthma Claims 37.05% 36.91% 37.01% 0.74
(2) Asthma ER + Asthma RX 0.69% 0.82% 0.73% 0.06
(3) IP Resp. Inf. + Asthma 0.04% 0.08% 0.05% 0.12
(4) IP Asthma 0.26% 0.32% 0.28% 0.15
(5) 2 Asthma RX 61.97% 61.87% 61.94% 0.82
Mean Age 34.09 27.19 32.09   <.01
% Females 57.41% 52.09% 55.87%   <.01
Geographic region 
Northeast 15.63% 47.56% 24.88%   <.01
North central 67.01% 8.76% 50.15%   <.01
South 12.05% 32.76% 18.04%   <.01
West 5.31% 10.92% 6.93%   <.01
Year of Trigger
1996 34.67% 13.13% 28.43%   <.01
1997 20.21% 13.55% 18.28%   <.01
1998 21.99% 14.62% 19.86%   <.01
1999 23.13% 58.71% 33.43%   <.01
Member Type
Employee 40.76% 38.68% 40.16%   <.01
Spouse 22.02% 17.55% 20.73%   <.01
Dependents 37.21% 43.77% 39.11%   <.01
4-11 years 15.76% 27.97% 19.30%   <.01
12-18 years 15.94% 14.24% 15.45%   <.01
Other 5.51% 1.57% 4.37%   <.01
County Race/Ethnicity
White
0 - 25% 0.49% 0.84% 0.59%   <.01
26 - 50% 1.44% 7.00% 3.05%  <.01
51 - 75% 21.25% 35.73% 25.44% <.01
76 - 100% 76.82% 56.43% 70.92% <.01
Black <.01
0 - 25% 91.70% 76.30% 87.24% <.01
26 - 50% 8.02% 22.85% 12.31% <.01
51 - 75% 0.26% 0.85% 0.43% <.01
76 - 100% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.15
Hispanic
0 - 25% 96.76% 93.35% 95.77% <.01
26 - 50% 2.67% 5.52% 3.49% <.01
51 - 75% 0.52% 1.13% 0.69% <.01
76 - 100% 0.06% 0.01% 0.04% <.01
Table 1:  Summary of Asthma Patient Characteristics 
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
Table 1:  Summary of Asthma Patient Characteristics 
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000
Other <.01
0 - 25% 99.94% 99.83% 99.91% <.01
26 - 50% 0.02% 0.15% 0.06% <.01
51 - 75% 0.04% 0.02% 0.03% 0.21
76 - 100% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.20
County Mean Household Income 27,001 31,223 28,269 <.01FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
All Patients, N 44,926 18,305 63,231 n/a
# Major diagnostic categories 6.26 5.35 6.00  <.01
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.79 0.62 0.74  <.01
Asthma-specific Comorbidites:  
Allergic Rhinitis 23.27% 18.67% 21.94%  <.01
Anxiety 2.39% 2.35% 2.38% 0.78
Depression 10.31% 8.17% 9.69%  <.01
GI Disorders 24.55% 20.73% 23.45%  <.01
Migraine 6.02% 5.05% 5.74%  <.01
Patients Aged 4-11, N 7,084 5,123 12,207 n/a
# Major diagnostic categories 5.19 4.85 5.05  <.01
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.55 0.51 0.53  <.01
Asthma-specific Comorbidites:  
Allergic Rhinitis 25.72% 20.69% 23.61% <.01
Anxiety 0.78% 0.49% 0.66% 0.05
Depression 4.29% 2.81% 3.67% <.01
GI Disorders 15.30% 14.50% 14.97% 0.22
Migraine 3.08% 3.10% 3.09% 0.93
Patients Aged 12-64, N 37,842 13,182 51,024 n/a
# Major diagnostic categories 6.46 5.55 6.22 <.01
Charlson Comorbidity Index 0.84 0.66 0.79 <.01
Asthma-specific Comorbidites:  
Allergic Rhinitis 22.81% 17.88% 21.53% <.01
Anxiety 2.69% 3.07% 2.79% 0.02
Depression 11.44% 10.26% 11.13% <.01
GI Disorders 26.28% 23.15% 25.47% <.01
Migraine 6.57% 5.81% 6.38% <.01
Table 2:  Co-Morbidities among Asthma Patients
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
N * 33,828 18,214 52,042 n/a
Prescription Copayment 5.20 8.64 6.20 <.01
For Asthma Related Drugs 5.06 8.04 5.92 <.01
For Non-Asthma Related Drugs 5.24 8.83 6.28 <.01
Outpatient Visit Copayment 7.71 8.10 7.84 <.01
For Asthma Related Visits 7.83 8.25 7.97 <.01
For Non-Asthma Related Visits 7.69 8.09 7.83 <.01
Emergency Room Visit Copayment 10.24 13.03 11.22 <.01
For Asthma Related Visits 15.25 13.92 14.79 <.01
For Non-Asthma Related Visits 9.89 12.94 10.96 <.01
Inpatient Visit Copayment 16.12 2.78 11.45 <.01
For Asthma Related Visits 18.07 1.79 12.37 <.01
For Non-Asthma Related Visits 15.92 2.94 11.38 <.01
* Average copayment was not available for all plans.
Table 3:  Plan-Level Average Copayments
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 n/a
Ratio of Controller to Reliever 1.49 1.17 1.40 <.01
Number of Asthma Prescriptions 4.89 4.17 4.68 <.01
Bronchodilators 0.71 0.37 0.61 <.01
Oral Steroids 0.45 0.45 0.45 0.69
SABAs 2.14 2.11 2.13 0.20
Inhaled Steroids 1.22 0.90 1.13 <.01
Luekotriene Modifiers 0.24 0.28 0.25 <.01
Anticholinergics 0.12 0.05 0.10 <.01
Estimated Days of Therapy
Bronchodilators 21.99 10.43 18.64 <.01
Oral Steroids 5.91 4.59 5.53 <.01
SABAs 46.44 41.75 45.09 <.01
Inhaled Steroids 30.19 20.96 27.51 <.01
Luekotriene Modifiers 8.89 9.09 8.94 0.61
Anticholinergics 2.89 1.07 2.36 <.01
Units Dispensed
Bronchodilators 34.05 14.86 28.50 <.01
Oral Steroids 18.65 18.16 18.51 0.44
SABAs 78.01 79.50 78.44 0.37
Inhaled Steroids 31.33 21.46 28.47 <.01
Luekotriene Modifiers 12.73 12.44 12.65 0.63
Anticholinergics 5.26 2.36 4.42 <.01
Selection of Asthma Medication
Bronchodilators 15.94% 9.66% 14.12% <.01
Oral Steroids 23.71% 26.42% 24.50% <.01
SABAs 76.57% 80.63% 77.75% <.01
Inhaled Steroids 35.00% 31.95% 34.11% <.01
Luekotriene Modifiers 5.88% 6.62% 6.09% <.01
Anticholinergics 4.14% 2.13% 3.56% <.01
Table 4:  Annualized Asthma Medication Claims
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000FFS Non-FFS Total P-Value
N 44,926 18,305 63,231 n/a
Measures of Health Care Use
Emergency room visits 0.38 0.37 0.38 0.09
Hospitalizations 0.08 0.05 0.07 <.01
Hospital Days 0.36 0.23 0.32 <.01
Outpatient visits 5.46 1.40 4.29 <.01
 
Table 5: Annualized Per Beneficiary Asthma-Related Health Care Utilization
by Insurance Plan Type, 1995-2000Table 6
Multinomial Logit Model of Medication Selection: Patients in FFS Plans
                          Controller Alone                      Controller + Reliever
Paramater Estimate Pr > | t | Paramater Estimate Pr > | t |
Intercept -3.4707     <0.001 -2.2667     <0.001
Demographics
Region North Central -0.3932     <0.001 -0.1591 0.0020
Region Northeast -0.0290 0.8430 -0.0014 0.9900
Region West -0.1649 0.1410 -0.0199 0.8070
Female -0.0119 0.7700 -0.1062     <0.001
Adult 0.8893     <0.001 0.2170     <0.001
Clinical Characteristics
Allergic Rhinitis 0.5128     <0.001 0.6086     <0.001
Migraine -0.0270 0.7380 -0.0390 0.5220
Depression -0.1795 0.0060 -0.0067 0.8850
GI disorders -0.0537 0.2740 -0.1022 0.0050
Sinusitis -0.0655 0.1520 0.0110 0.7400
Anxiety disorders -0.1843 0.1320 -0.2209 0.0150
#3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.0483     <0.001 0.0481     <0.001
County Characteristics
County Average Income $15-20K 0.2960 0.3290 -0.0804 0.6810
County Average Income $20-25K
0.4274 0.1550 0.0241 0.9010
County Average Income $25-35K 0.3661 0.2240 0.0713 0.7140
County Average Income >$35K 0.8503 0.0050 0.1602 0.4170
Copay Variables     
Ratio of Controller/Reliever Copayment -0.0667 0.5030 0.0308 0.6820
Tax Provider ID Controller % 6.4705     <0.001 1.1769 0.1840
Tax Provider ID Combination% 1.0605 0.0320 4.1513     <0.001
Chi2(3)* 60.3200     <0.001 164.5700     <0.001
LR chi2(38) 1816.3600     <0.001
Psuedo-R2 0.0341
Number of Observations 26379
Notes: Referance category is Reliever Alone. * Chi-square test for significance of copay variables.Table 7
Multinomial Logit Model of Medication Selection: Patients in Non-FFS Plans
                          Controller Alone                      Controller + Reliever
Paramater Estimate Pr > | t | Paramater Estimate Pr > | t |
Intercept -6.1203     <0.001 -5.2240     <0.001
Demographics
Region North Central -0.2239 0.0880 -0.1658 0.0440
Region Northeast -0.2124 0.0960 -0.0735 0.3350
Region West -0.2940 0.0170 -0.3179     <0.001
Female -0.0941 0.2870 -0.1897     <0.001
Adult 1.1020     <0.001 0.2973     <0.001
Clinical Characteristics
Allergic Rhinitis 0.8721     <0.001 0.7965     <0.001
Migraine -0.0033 0.9870 0.1745 0.2130
Depression 0.0975 0.5540 -0.1856 0.1160
GI disorders -0.0568 0.6290 -0.1773 0.0230
Sinusitis 0.0685 0.5400 0.0651 0.3690
Anxiety disorders -0.6812 0.0450 -0.3315 0.1250
#3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.0667      <0.001 0.0632     <0.001
County Characteristics
County Average Income $15-20K -0.2739 0.5990 -0.2224 0.5050
County Average Income $20-25K
-0.1448 0.7660 -0.1310 0.6770
County Average Income $25-35K -0.1357 0.7770 -0.2558 0.4080
County Average Income >$35K -0.3545 0.4770 -0.3857 0.2280
Copay Variables
Ratio of Controller/Reliever Copayments 0.0816 0.7120 0.6444     <0.001
Tax ID Prescriber Controller % 11.4306 0.0030 1.0697 0.6640
Tax ID Prescriber Combination% 6.6881 0.0650 11.1009     <0.001
Chi2(3)* 16.1400 0.0011 53.6800     <0.001
LR chi2(38) 598.6700     <0.001
Psuedo-R2 0.0463
Number of Observations 6768
Note: Referamce category is Reliever AloneTable 8. Log-Linear Regression Results: Patients in FFS Plans
[Dependent Variable: Log(Total Payments)]
                        Controller Alone           Controller + Reliever Reliever Alone
Selectivity Adjusted NOT Adjusted Selectivity Adjusted NOT Adjusted Selectivity Adjusted NOT Adjusted
Parameter Pr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t | ParameterPr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t |
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept 1.9666 0.1070 6.0066   <0.001 5.1129   <0.001 6.1208   <0.001 2.1427   <0.001 5.0938   <0.001
Demographics
Region North Central 0.2803   <0.001 0.0633 0.1480 0.2251   <0.001 0.0277 0.2860 0.2460   <0.001 -0.0547 0.1360
Region Northeast 0.1217 0.3370 0.0510 0.6300 0.0421 0.5890 -0.0277 0.6590 -0.0985 0.3030 -0.1831 0.0160
Region West 0.0961 0.2430 -0.0021 0.9790 0.0357 0.6270 -0.0488 0.2720 -0.0528 0.5290 -0.1999   <0.001
Female -0.0138 0.6880 -0.0282 0.3620 0.0364 0.1000 0.0018 0.9160 0.0295 0.4590 0.0208 0.2720
Adult 0.0208 0.8410 0.6823   <0.001 0.2500 0.0010 0.6550   <0.001 0.1375 0.0510 0.6722   <0.001
Clinical Characteristics
Allergic Rhinitis -0.1254 0.0030 0.1099 0.0010 -0.1567   <0.001 0.1311   <0.001 -0.0451 0.0180 0.1312   <0.001
Migraine -0.0165 0.7140 -0.0320 0.5810 0.0102 0.8330 -0.0150 0.6480 -0.0002 0.9950 -0.0284 0.5050
Depression 0.3995  <0.001 0.3139   <0.001 0.3262   <0.001 0.2709   <0.001 0.4994   <0.001 0.4013   <0.001
GI disorders 0.0789 0.0090 0.0648 0.0710 0.1248   <0.001 0.0992   <0.001 0.0661 0.1720 0.0460 0.0640
Sinusitis 0.0539 0.0510 0.0222 0.5120 -0.0033 0.8630 -0.0139 0.4530 0.0220 0.3810 -0.0107 0.6360
Anxiety disorders 0.1709 0.1370 0.0651 0.4730 0.2036 0.0100 0.0827 0.1090 0.3699   <0.001 0.2874   <0.001
#3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.0877  <0.001 0.1055   <0.001 0.0763   <0.001 0.0986   <0.001 0.1119   <0.001 0.1324   <0.001
County Characteristics
County Average Income $15- -0.1565 0.6690 -0.0311 0.8940 0.0583 0.6350 0.0944 0.3860 0.0111 0.9420 0.1220 0.3730
County Average Income $20- -0.2616 0.4660 -0.0493 0.8310 -0.0396 0.7390 0.0696 0.5190 -0.0803 0.5820 0.1146 0.4000
County Average Income $25- -0.1384 0.6950 0.0375 0.8710 -0.0055 0.9670 0.0906 0.4010 -0.0379 0.8140 0.1104 0.4190
County Average Income  -0.4295 0.2400 -0.0510 0.8270 -0.2139 0.1420 0.0553 0.6140 -0.3223 0.0290 0.0816 0.5560
Correlations
Lamda(1) -3.1896  <0.001 -7.0098   <0.001 -8.9698   <0.001
Lamda(2) -10.5181  <0.001 -4.1839   <0.001 -8.2394   <0.001
Lamda(3) -7.8338  <0.001 -5.4709   <0.001 -3.1968   <0.001
R-square 0.4597  0.4791  
Hausman Test Statistic -13.9200   <0.001   -189.900   <0.001   <0.001 62.0700   <0.001
Number of Observations 3903   11427   11049
Notes: 1. Lamda is the conditional expected values of the residuals derived from controller alone(1), controller+reliever(2) and reliever alone(3)-multinomial 
logit equation. 2. P-values are derived from bootstrapped standard errors. Table 9. Log-Linear Regression Results: Patients in Non-FFS Plans
[Dependent Variable: Log(Total Payments)]
                        Controller Alone               Controller+Reliever                      Reliever Alone
Selectivity Adjusted NOT Adjusted Selectivity Adjusted NOT Adjusted Selectivity AdjustedNOT Adjusted
ParameterPr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t | Parameter Pr > | t | ParameterPr > | t | ParameterPr > | t | ParameterPr > | t |
Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate Estimate
Intercept 3.1781 0.0660 5.6622   <0.001 4.0577   <0.001 3.5437   <0.001 3.7828   <0.001 4.5272   <0.001
Demographics
Region North Central -0.0192 0.9200 -0.0674 0.5690 0.0679 0.4200 0.0688 0.2240 -0.0722 0.1220 -0.0908 0.1640
Region Northeast 0.0627 0.7480 -0.0121 0.9220 0.1229 0.0640 0.1263 0.1500 -0.0072 0.9330 0.0157 0.8020
Region West -0.3234 0.0040 -0.3268 0.0030 -0.1499 0.0650 -0.1729 0.0390 -0.2879   <0.001 -0.2616   <0.001
Female -0.0143 0.8840 0.0329 0.6670 0.0515 0.3350 0.0520 0.3010 -0.0028 0.9630 -0.0105 0.7990
Adult 0.0170 0.9550 0.4876   <0.001 0.5631   <0.001 0.6438   <0.001 0.8801   <0.001 0.7813   <0.001
Clinical Characteristics
Allergic Rhinitis 0.2900 0.1590 0.1509 0.0840 0.2727 0.0210 0.3353   <0.001 0.2532 0.0060 0.0820 0.2230
Migraine 0.1048 0.4700 -0.0253 0.8820 0.0991 0.4890 0.1046 0.1190 0.0926 0.5090 0.0606 0.6120
Depression 0.4014   <0.001 0.5120   <0.001 0.2330   <0.001 0.2548 0.0020 0.6096   <0.001 0.5847   <0.001
GI disorders 0.0911 0.3520 0.1856 0.0680 0.1223 0.0060 0.1212 0.0160 0.1177 0.0610 0.1100 0.0680
Sinusitis -0.0216 0.8150 -0.0048 0.9590 0.0600 0.1570 0.0607 0.0850 -0.0919 0.0740 -0.1036 0.0750
Anxiety disorders 0.1594 0.7060 0.0599 0.8400 0.1935 0.1880 0.1409 0.2510 0.1276 0.1330 0.2035 0.2150
#3-digit ICD-9 codes 0.1413   <0.001 0.1277   <0.001 0.1249   <0.001 0.1292   <0.001 0.1871   <0.001 0.1792   <0.001
County Characteristics
County Average Income $15-
20K -0.1889 0.6200 -0.2485 0.5700 0.2593 0.4400 0.2088 0.3820 -0.2283 0.6180 -0.1431 0.6050
County Average Income $20-
25K -0.4244 0.2990 -0.4548 0.2640 0.1860 0.5540 0.1668 0.3830 -0.0160 0.9720 0.0184 0.9440
County Average Income $25-
35K -0.5821 0.2100 -0.5504 0.1730 0.1211 0.7070 0.0628 0.7520 -0.0408 0.9310 -0.0328 0.8990
County Average Income >$35K
-0.4976 0.2950 -0.5362 0.2040 0.2382 0.4620 0.1771 0.4640 0.0865 0.8570 0.0843 0.7510
Correlations
Lamda(1) -2.3181 0.0000 -3.4653 0.0010    -1.1454 0.4450
Lamda(2) -5.6860 0.0000 -2.1676   <0.001    -3.9541   <0.001
Lamda(3) -7.3977 0.0000 -5.0881   <0.001    -1.9950   <0.001
R-square 0.4563 0.3806 0.3872
Hausman Test Statistic 16.2200 0.4381 -4.8800    >0.999 3.3300 0.9997
Number of Observations 711 2881 3176
Notes: 1. Lamda is the conditional expected values of the residuals derived from controller alone(1), controller+reliever(2) and reliever alone(3)-multinomial 
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